IDARP: ID-based Address Resolution Protocol by Lone, Imtiyaz Ahmad et al.
Council for Innovative Research                                                  International Journal of Computers & Technology 
www.cirworld.com                                                                    Volume 4 No. 2, March-April, 2013, ISSN 2277-3061 
277 | P a g e                                                    w w w . i j c t o n l i n e . c o m  
IDARP: ID-based Address Resolution Protocol 
                                        Imtiyaz Ahmad lone*,Jahangeer Ali,Kalimullah lone 
Computer science & Engg., Lovely Professional university , Jalandhar 
Imtiyaz.it@gmail.com  
Computer science & Engg., Lovely Professional university , Jalandhar  
Jaims7575@gmail.com  
Computer science & Engg., Lovely Professional university , Jalandhar  
Kalimullahlone@gmail.com 
ABSTRACT 
In this paper, security attacks in ARP are classified and logically organized/represented in a more lucid manner.ARP 
provides no authentication mechanism to the incoming request packets this is the reason that any client can forge an ARP 
message contains malicious information to poison the  ARP cache of target host. There are many possible attacks on ARP 
which can make the communication unsecure such as man-in-the-middle (MITM), Denial of service (DOS) and cloning 
attack  
Indexing terms 
denial of service (DOS) Attacks, man-in-the-middle (MITM), Address resolution protocol (ARP) 
INTRODUCTION  
The Address resolution protocol is the protocol is used to map the internet protocol (IP) address into the hardware address 
(MAC).When the host machine wants to know a physical address for any host in the network, it broadcasts the ARP 
request, the host that owns the IP address sends the unicast ARP reply message to indicating its MAC address. Each host 
machine maintains a table called ARP cache, used to convert IP addresses into MAC addresses There are many security 
threats in the ARP which leads us to unsecure communication because ARP is the stateless protocol, every time a host 
gets an ARP reply from another host, even though it has not sent an ARP request for that reply, it accepts that ARP entry 
and updates its ARP cache. The process of updating the host‟s ARP cache with the forged entry is referred to as 
poisoning, in fact a malicious user can poison the ARP caches to impersonate hosts, perform MITM and DOS attacks. 
PROBLEM DEFINITION 
After the ARP was drafted, a subtle weakness was found.Infact Arp does not provide the authentication to the source of 
incoming ARP packets this is the reason that an attacker can forge an ARP message containing malicious information to 
poison the ARP cache of the target host.ARP is a simple protocol that it works on the following. 
ARP-request, the host wants to learn the MAC address of the another host in a particular network, broadcasts the ARP 
request on the network “Who has IP xxx.xx.xx.xx ? tell me your MAC address mm.mm.mm.mm.mm”. 
ARP-reply, all the host in the particular network receive the request. The host with the given IP address will reply in a 
unicast ARP reply and send its MAC address to the requester. 
ARP suffers from the lot of  threats which leads it to insecure  communication and the lonely reason for these attacks is 
the no authentication  mechanism is used in the ARP.When the victim adds an incorrect (IP,MAC) mapping to its ARP  
cache, this is known as the cache poisoning or Arp spoofing. The ARP poisoning is done when the attacker sends the fake 
<IP,MAC> address in the response of ARP request, The ARP is stateless protocol and it accepts all the incoming ARP 
packets and modifies the local ARP cache.ARP poisoning attacks are often used as a part other serious attacks or we can 
say Arp poisoning is the base for the various attacks: 
Dos attacks 
An attacker can attack to victim‟s cache by sending the fake<IP,MAC> addresses  so that every packet the sender will 
send will be received by the attacker instead of its real destination, In Dos attack attacker can block all the communication 
from the host being attacked. 
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Fig. 1 Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack 
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MITM attack 
The man-in-the middle attack is little different than the Dos attack, in MITM the attacker attacks two hosts at the same time 
by cache spoofing two hosts in the network, the attacker can silently sit between the two hosts and can read/ write the 
communication between two victims so that they think that they are communicating with each other, this attack is passive 
attack and is difficult to detect 
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Fig. 2 Man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack 
Cloning attack 
The cloning attack has the different process for attacks than above two attacks, the attacker changes its IP and MAC 
address to become identical to those of victim host. Once the change is done there will be the two host with same 
addresses and victim will get confuse who is the real host and sometimes when the real host is disconnected in network 
the attacker can make the advantage and can attack as real host without any hesitation. This situation can cause the 
network troubles and we can say that it will lead to Dos attacks also. 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Till present time there are many solutions for ARP-attacks to prevent the ARP-cache poisoning attacks and also provides 
the solution for security of ARP. Many researchers have done a good job and effort to prevent the attacks in ARP but 
these solutions have some drawbacks which cannot be tolerated by the network communication mechanism these 
solutions and their drawbacks. The drawback is that some of the solutions have no backward compatibility option and 
some of them use cryptography to exchange encrypted data which is not feasible because it takes too much time in 
encrypting the packets and few of them uses the server/middleware based solution which has the big drawback that a 
single crash of server can lead to failure in communication. 
S-ARP: A Secure Address Resolution Protocol  
D. Brusch et al. [1] proposed a solution for ARP- attack which uses the cryptography to secure the address resolution 
protocol. In this mechanism the sender and receiver has the private and public keys both sender and receiver uses these 
pair of keys to sign the message to provide the authentication and security. These keys are distributed by the third trusted 
party known as certification authority which helps the users in the network to provide a security mechanism. The first 
drawback of this mechanism is that this solution has no backward compatibility means that it takes a large cost and tough 
hard work to implement in the existing ARP and this solution will also lead to network conjunction because the certification 
authority cannot handle multiple users at a time. The second and the main drawback is that the failure of the certification 
authority will lead to the failure of all whole networks. 
TARP: Ticket-based Address Resolution Protocol 
Wesam Lootah et al. [2] proposed a Ticket- based ARP is another solution for security of ARP attacks, this solution is a 
well featured solution which also used the cryptography to solve the ARP threat. In this mechanism uses the ticket. Ticket-
based Address Resolution Protocol (TARP). TARP implements security by distributing centrally issued secure MAC/IP 
address mapping attestations called tickets, are given to clients as they join the network and are subsequently distributed 
through existing ARP messages. Tickets authenticate the association between MAC and IP addresses through statements 
signed by the Local Ticket Agent (LTA).This solution suggests us to make use of cryptography for generating tickets and a 
server which will distribute tickets, this solution is very hard and the failure of server can fail the whole method of security, 
so this solution is not feasible. 
A middleware approach to asynchronous and backward compatible detection and prevention 
of ARP cache poisoning 
Tripunitara et al. [3] proposed  a  middleware  approach  to  asynchronous  and  backward  compatible  detection  and  
prevention  of  ARP  cache  poisoning  attacks .  Their implementation requires a “Streams based protocol stack,” but 
could be ported to other platforms. The proposed solution is to block unsolicited ARP replies and to raise alarms when a 
reply is inconsistent with the currently cached ARP entry.  Implementing this scheme requires the installation of the 
middleware on every host on the network.  The middleware was also designed to work in the presence of gratuitous ARP 
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messages and proxy ARP servers. One important limitation of this  solution  is  that  since  it  depends  on  duplicates  to  
detect attacks,  it  does  not  prevent/detect  attacks  in  which  the  host  being spoofed is down or being attacked by DoS. 
The second limitation of this solution is that failure of the middleware can lead to the failure of trust on network. 
A Hardware Approach for detecting the ARP Attack 
M.M.Dessouky et al. [4] proposed one of the solutions of ARP- attacks, this solution needs the hardware approach or we 
can say hardware is used to detect the ARP-attacks and then these attacks can be solved after detection. There are so 
many tools used to detect the ARP-attacks like ARPwatch, Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) and ARP guard etc. These 
tools have the common goal to detect the ARP attack and then solve it. 
ARPWATCH 
With ARPwatch, the network administrator is alerted via e-mail when (IP, MAC) address pairings change. This tool is very 
lightweight and widely available, but it depends on the network administrator being able to differentiate between non-
forged events and ARP cache poisoning attacks, and also on his ability to take appropriate and elapsed time measured 
when an attack occurs. 
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) 
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) like ARPwatch are usually able to detect ARP attacks and inform the administrator 
with the generation of an appropriate alert or alarm. The main problem with IDSs is that they end to generate a high 
number of wrong positives (alarms that turn out to be not part of attacks), that for them to be effective, it becomes a must 
for the company to put somebody in charge of dealing with these events. While IDSs are a good option for enhancing 
security, their ability to detect ARP. 
 ARP-GUARD 
ARP-Guard uses a sensor-based architecture to detect several internal network attacks like ARP attacks. The 
management system alerts administrators in case an ARP attack is detected from the analysis of the information received 
from the LAN and SNMP (Simple Network Management Protocol) sensors. MAC spoofing attacks can be detected by 
sending an Inverse ARP (InARP) request for a MAC address.  
These hardware approaches are used to deal with the detection of ARP-attacks, obviously these hardware mechanism 
have the capability to detect the ARP-attacks but have the big drawbacks. The failure of hardware can lead to the failure of 
security of ARP and this approach has no backward compatibility and cannot be implemented in the existing ARP system. 
To implement such type of ARP security system we have need of a hardware device in every network or in every sub 
network, to place the hardware device in every network can utilize a lot of cost and we have to change the hardware 
device after a period and hardware also requires a power to work.In short the hardware approach is very infeasible in the 
world of computers. 
A secure address resolution protocol 
Mohamed G. Gouda et al. [5] proposed architecture for resolving IP addresses into hardware addresses over an Ethernet. 
The architecture consists of a secure server connected to the network and two protocols used to communicate with the 
server: an invite-accept protocol and a request-reply protocol. The invite-accept protocol is used by hosts to register their 
(IP, MAC) mappings with the server. The request-reply protocol is used by hosts to obtain the MAC address of a host 
connected to the LAN, from the database of the secure server. Every time node has to request the sever for the invite-
accept protocol and request-reply protocol for authentication and the attacker can also use of cloning attack to eavesdrop 
the communication between two systems. The main drawback of this solution is the whole mechanism is dependent on 
the sever, solution is not beneficial without sever that means that the crash of server or attack on sever can easily allow 
attacker to attack and also this solution is not practical because it requires change in whole mechanism of ARP so it is 
hard to implement and is not feasible and has no backward compatibility. 
P-ARP: A novel enhanced authentication scheme for securing ARP 
P Limmaneewichid et al. [6] proposed a scheme they use standard ARP request/reply packets. They only add an 
authentication data, in an ARP trailer. For the proposed method, so called the cryptographic trailer based authentication 
scheme for ARP, they make use of trailer protocol. The trailer consists of three fields that are the Magic Number, Nonce 
and Authentication Data. The field „Magic Number‟ is used to distinguish whether an ARP packet carries an ARP 
authentication trailer. The Magic Number is a fixed constant defined as hexadecimal 0x22. It is used to distinguish whether 
a trailer carries the Authentication Data. The field „Nonce‟ is an unsigned random number that is used to prevent replay 
attacks. Finally, the field „Authentication Data‟ is the output of the keyed cryptographic hash function used to validate 
received ARP reply packets. This method provides a better solution without any hardware implementation and without 
middleware but has a drawback that it enlarges the packet size of the ARP request and ARP-reply and this mechanism 
needs the long processing system and the main drawback of the solution is that we need a secure channel to share a key 
between the different user to use the mechanism. The attacker can also decrypt the one-way function algorithm such as 
HMAC-MD5 with 128-bit keys used in this solution and can get the secret key shared between the different users. 
Preventing ARP Attacks using a Fuzzy-Based Stateful ARP Cache 
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Zouheir Trabelsi et al. [7] proposed prevention mechanism is based on the use of a stateful ARP cache. When host A 
generates an ARP  request to get the MAC address of host B, an entry is created  in its stateful ARP cache, with the 
status of ”Waiting”. Host A waits for an ARP reply, within a predefined timeout. If an ARP reply comes, then host A waits 
another timeout in order to collect other possible ARP replies sent by other hosts in the network. Note that if host A 
receives more than one ARP reply, then this means that most likely more than one host has replied. Therefore, among 
those hosts, only one host is an honest host, which is host B. The others are probably malicious hosts, performing ARP 
cache poisoning attack to corrupt the ARP cache of host A. This proposed solution has less capability to detect the ARP 
attack because the host cannot judge exactly which one is real host and which one fake in the case of cloning attack and 
using of stateful cache cannot be used to prevent the ARP attacks and sometimes is is useless to detect the attack. 
ES-ARP: An Efficient and Secure Address Resolution Protocol 
Ataullah et al.[8] proposed one of the latest and new proposal for ARP security mechanism. The main concept of this 
approach is to broadcast the ARP-reply. So that in the case of ARP attack the victim may be aware about the attack. The 
idea of broadcasting the ARP-reply may be considered as a better solution without third trusted party but this is only a 
detection technique and the attack cannot be prevented by this proposed solution. The cloning attack is also possible by 
using the broadcasting mechanism to secure ARP, The attacker can make use of MAC spoofing attack and ES_ARP will 
not be capable to detect the difference between real and fake user. The broadcast storm in network is possible by 
broadcasting the ARP-reply which sometimes leads to the network failure and conjunction in network. 
PROPOSED SOLUTION 
From the above literature survey which shows that there are many security solutions for ARP but either they fully 
dependent on the third trust party or some of them use the secure server to distribute the cryptographic keys to encrypt 
the packet or message, many solutions use hardware equipment 
Trusted Third party  
Some solutions use third trust party to distribute cryptographic keys to encrypt the message/ packet to ensure 
authentication between the hosts or may used for directly authentication between host but using of third trusted party is 
not bad concept but the security solution should not fully dependent upon the certification authority  the solution should be 
work better when the sever may crash. 
Hardware based solutions  
Many solutions has suggested to make use of hardware devices such as  ARPWATCH and ARPGAURD  etc to detect 
ARP attacks but using of the Hardware equipments require the  alert administration about attack and then the 
administrator will try to prevent the attack. The hardware device will consume the power and we have to place the 
hardware devices on every network and crash of hardware device will fail all the security of ARP 
Cryptographic solutions 
Solutions that are based upon the cryptography  make also use of secure server which helps in key distribution, the 
practice of using cryptography to secure  ARP makes it complex than other protocols and the resolution of address will 
take much time in getting keys from server and then encrypting /decrypting  of packet, and in case of server crash the 
security mechanism will not work, failure of server will lead to insecure communication and brute-force – attacks can also 
crack the hash function to get the security keys. 
ID-Based Address Resolution Protocol 
So here is now need of such solution which will be feasible and should work properly in any condition, we are introducing 
an new and simple security mechanism to secure ARP which is based on the unique identity of each user and these ID‟s 
will be generated by a third trusted party in the initial stage when the host will want to join the network. There are basically 
two important things in our proposed solution (1) ID generator (third trusted party) (2) unique identity. 
 ID Generator 
Third trusted party will be placed in the network to secure the ARP which will do two important tasks (a) it will generate 
unique id for each host who will join the network and then will store this particular information (b) it will help in updating the 
host‟s ARP cache. 
Unique Identity 
 Each user will be given the unique identity when user joins the network, the length of the ID will be 16 bits and will be 
added to the ARP-packet as an additional field. 
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Fig1. Working of ID-Based ARP 
When the host will join the network it will first register itself in the ID generator for the assignment of unique ID and update 
its cache. Host will first request to the third party to  generate ID , third party will give it its unique ID  when the host will 
receive the unique ID then it will send its second request  to ID generator fetch recent update  to update its own cache. 
After updating cache it will directly communicate to other host in this particular network, no broadcast request and reply is 
needed. The ID generator will always keep eye on the redundancy of addresses and will discard the recent redundant 
address if the situation will arise. By using this proposed solution attacker will never attack the communication between 
two hosts, if the attacker will try to perform an attack to any host the by performing the masquerade of any host, the host 
will check the combination of MAC address, IP address and ID, if the host will judge that the combination does not match 
with its existing cache information, the client will request to  ID generator to update its cache again. In case of failure in 
third party the solution will efficiently work because ID‟s are given to every host until immediate recovery. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1. New packet structure of ID-Based ARP 
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Fig 2 Architecture of ID-based ARP network 
Hardware type(16 bits) 
Protocol type (16 bits) 
Length of hardware address Length of protocol address 
Operator (16 bits) 
Hardware address of sender 
Protocol address of a sender 
Unique  ID of sender 
Hardware address of receiver 
Protocol address of a receiver 
Unique  ID of receiver 
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Flow Chart of ID-Based ARP 
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COMPARISON OF EXISTING SOLUTIONS 
In this section we have discussed the comparison between above existing solutions, we have analysed their performance 
and the mechanism used for security and also the hardware equipment used for several solutions and some of them have 
used the cryptography mechanism to for key sharing to secure the ARP and many of them have used the third trusted 
party for security purpose of ARP. The below table will briefly show the different existing solutions and their performance 
also mechanism used. 
Table 1: Requirement for different schemes, performance degradation and used mechanism for each scheme 
Existing 
Solution 
Crypto- 
graphy used 
Hosts on 
network 
New device 
added  
to network 
Switches Performance  
Degradation 
 
Mechanism 
S-ARP [1] Yes Trusted Host  
Authoritative 
Key  
Distributor 
(AKD) 
N/A N/A High Signed ARP 
replies 
TARP [2] Yes Trusted Host 
Local  
Ticket Agent 
(LTA) 
N/A N/A Low Centrally 
issued tickets  
authenticate 
(IP, MAC)  
associations 
Tripunitara 
et al.[3] 
No Special 
middleware 
N/A N/A Very low Heuristics 
used to block 
ARP  
replies at 
receiver 
Dessouky et 
al. [4] 
No N/A The HW 
board is  
connected to 
switch 
N/A No Ping protocol 
to generate 
alarm 
Gouda et al. 
[5] 
No Special 
Secure  
Server 
N/A N/A N/A (replaces  
ARP) 
Secure server 
resolves 
queries 
Limmaneewi
chid et al[6] 
Yes N/A N/A N/A Very low Shared key is 
used for 
authentication 
and new 
fields are 
added 
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P-ARP Yes N/A N/A N/A Very low Different 
felids are 
added to  
ARP- packet  ES-ARP(8) NO N/A N/A N/A Medium ARP-reply is 
broadcasted 
at every ARP-
request Proposed 
Solution 
NO ID generator N?A N?A High Unique ID is 
given to every 
host by ID 
generator 
CONCLUSIONS 
In conclusion the main aim of this paper is to differentiate between the various solutions of address resolution protocol and 
also discuss the limitations of these existing solutions. We  analyzed  several  currently  available  solutions;  identify  their  
strengths and  limitations  and  provide  comparison  among  them. We have introduced a new simple and secure Address 
Resolution protocol which will be feasible and will make sure to secure the whole communication going between multiple 
hosts, no attack is possible in this type of mechanism because every user has its unique MAC,IP and ID, the ID generator 
will keep eye on the redundancy of addresses and attack. 
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